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Abstract
Often in cooperative situations, many aspects of the decisionmaking environment are uncertain. We investigate how
cooperation is shaped by the way information about risk is
presented (from description or from experience) and by
differences in risky environments. Drawing on research from
risky choice, we compare choices in stochastic social
dilemmas to those in lotteries with equivalent levels of risk.
Cooperation rates in games vary with different levels of risk
across decision situations with the same expected outcomes,
thereby mimicking behavior in lotteries. Risk presentation,
however, only affected choices in lotteries, not in stochastic
games. Process data suggests that people respond less to
probabilities in the stochastic social dilemmas than in the
lotteries. The findings highlight how an uncertain
environment shapes cooperation and call for models of the
underlying decision processes.
Keywords: Decisions from Experience; Cooperation; Risky
Choice; Public Good.

Cooperation in Risky Environments
When people face an opportunity to cooperate, such as
when opening a business together or pursuing a joint
research project, the outcomes of these enterprises are
frequently uncertain. On the one hand, joint enterprises
often constitute a social dilemma, where it is in the
collective interest of the group to cooperate, yet individually
rational to free ride. Despite these incentives, there is
overwhelming evidence that many people still engage in
cooperation (e.g., Ostrom, 1990). On the other hand, even if
people cooperate outcomes often are uncertain due to a risky
environment. For instance, even if all business partners
cooperate, a new start-up may fail due to external events,
such as natural disasters disrupting supplier shipments.
Laboratory experiments show that when social dilemmas are
embedded in a stochastic environment, cooperation declines
sharply (for a review see E.Van Dijk et al., 2004). What has
not been addressed is how different levels of environmental
risk and the format in which it is presented affect
cooperation.
Studies on risky choice find a pronounced difference in
behavior depending on how information in lotteries is

presented: whether people sample the distribution of
outcomes (decisions from experience) or decide based on a
summary description of outcomes and probabilities
(decision from description) (for a review see Rakow &
Newell, 2010). In conventional lotteries with described
probabilities, people choose as-if they overweight small
probabilities as reflected in Prospect Theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1992). In contrast, people decide as-if they
underweight small probabilities if they acquire risk
information sequentially by sampling (Hertwig et al., 2004).
The difference in choice patterns between decisions from
description and experience has been labeled the descriptionexperience gap (DE gap).
In lotteries, outcomes depend on environmental risk
alone, whereas outcomes in social dilemmas also depend on
the choices of other individuals. Stochastic social dilemmas
thus combine social uncertainty and environmental risk. Yet
our understanding of cooperation in stochastic environments
is currently limited to situations in which environmental risk
is described by outcomes and probabilities (e.g., BerebyMeyer & Roth, 2006; Gong et al., 2009; Levati et al., 2009).
We argue that real-world risky choices often involve
experiencing the outcomes and probabilities of choices
rather than receiving their summary statistics. Therefore,
examining how risk presentation influences people’s
decisions is critical to understand how and when people
cooperate in risky environments.
There is one important presupposition: risk presentation
can influence cooperation only if people are responsive to
differences in environmental risk. In lotteries, people’s
decisions have been found to vary with different levels of
risk, i.e. for different combinations of outcomes and
probabilities while keeping the expected value constant.
Analogously, one can describe a stochastic social dilemma
by the expected payoffs of cooperation. In a one-shot
prisoner's dilemma, people not only cooperate but also
respond to different outcomes (Guyer & Rapoport, 1972).
Extending this finding to a stochastic setting, the second
goal of this study is to establish whether and how different
levels of risk affect behavior in one-shot social dilemmas
with the same expected payoffs.
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Like other types of choices, cooperation is a function of
the match between decision processes and the decisionmaking environment, or what has been labeled ecological
rationality. Besides social uncertainty, which has been
studied extensively, the levels of environmental risk and
uncertainty are critical components of real-world
environments that researchers are only recently beginning to
appreciate. For instance, cooperation unravels slower in a
stochastic social dilemma than in a deterministic one
(Bereby-Meyer & Roth, 2006), and groups cooperate more
than individuals (Gong et al., 2009). None of the studies,
however, addresses how differences in risky environments
and the way risk is presented affects cooperation.

Experiment
The goal of the study is to investigate how risk presentation
and different levels of environmental risk affect cooperation
in a social dilemma. Even if the outcomes of cooperation
also depend on the action of others, the environmental risk
affects all who cooperate equally. We thus expect both
aspects to influence cooperation in risky environments in
the same way as lottery choices with environmental risk
alone. To facilitate understanding, we present the detailed
hypotheses (see below) after the implementation.
We used a 2 x 2 between-subjects design in which we
manipulated risk presentation (description vs. experience)
and choice situation (social dilemma vs. lottery). In the
description condition, subjects received information about
how environmental risk influenced outcomes in a social
dilemma as a probability statement, whereas in the
experience condition participants sampled to infer the
probabilities. To control whether the values and
probabilities chosen to implement environmental risk
replicated the DE gap, two further groups made decisions in
lotteries, again either from description or experience. The
environmental risk was identical between lotteries and
games. To investigate how different levels of risk affect
behavior in one-shot social dilemmas, we varied
probabilities and outcomes within-subjects while keeping
the expected outcomes constant.

Methods
Environmental Risk in Social Dilemmas and Lotteries
For the social dilemma conditions, we used a stochastic 2person public goods game (PG) with binary choices. For
each choice, participants receive an endowment e (10€)
which they could contribute to a joint project with a
randomly matched partner or keep for themselves.
Contributions were multiplied by a value (msr) and shared
equally between both pair members. Denoting i’s
contribution by ci, where ci ∈ {0, e} and i = 1, 2, i’s payoff
is given by
msr
πi = e - ci +
(c1 + c 2 ).
(1)
2
We impose msr ∈{1, 2}. An msr > 1 made it socially
optimal to contribute, whereas an msr < 2 rendered free-

riding the dominant strategy for a selfish person, thus
creating a social dilemma.
We manipulated environmental risk by assigning the msr
to one of two possible values, representing either a good or
a bad event, with a certain probability. In case the bad event
occured (with probability p), contributions were multiplied
by an msr < 1, decreasing the value of the public good.
When the good event occured, contributions were multiplied
by an msr > 1, increasing the value of the contributions. The
environmental risk only affected what was invested.
Cooperation thus represents the risky and non-cooperation
the sure option. We chose the two potential msr-values and
corresponding probabilities such that the expected msr,
E[msr], across good and bad event always yielded a social
dilemma with 1 < E[msr] < 2.
Table 1 illustrates the eight decision situations employed.
Situations 1 to 4 contained rare (p < 0.25) bad events,
analogous to the DE gap studies with lotteries (e.g., Hertwig
et al., 2004). Situations 5 and 6 contained more common (p
> 0.25) bad events to test whether the DE gap extends
beyond rare events as found by Ludvig and Spetch (2011).
We use two different expected msr, 1.2 and 1.4, to check the
robustness of the results. Situations 1 – 6 were designed to
extend the findings from the DE gap studies in risky choice
to social dilemmas. At the same time, keeping the expected
msr constant across different combinations of probabilities
and potential returns allows us to test whether different
levels of environmental risk affect choices in the PG in the
same way in which they affect choices in lotteries.
Decision situation 7 and 8 explored boundary conditions
of a social dilemma and provided a further control of
participants’ understanding of the incentives. In situation 7,
the E[msr] equaled 1.1, which made it less attractive to
cooperate compared to situations 1 – 6. In contrast to the
other situations, here the rare event was the good state of the
world. Different from situations 1 to 7, the expected msr of
2.1 in situation 8 did not generate a social dilemma and
made it individually and socially optimal to cooperate.
In most studies on the DE gap, the risky option has an
expected value that is only marginally higher than the sure
option. To avoid floor effects in the social dilemma, we
used relatively large expected msr. This should provide
strong incentives to cooperate in the PG but results in a
larger difference between the expected msr-value of the sure
option and risky option. To control whether the parameters
we chose for implementing environmental risk replicated
the DE gap in more standard settings, we ran the same
choices as lotteries with identical environmental risks. In the
lottery conditions, participants also received an endowment
e and had to decide whether to invest into a risky option.
The risky option in each lottery used the same two possible
msr with the same probabilities as the corresponding PG.
Yet, while the payoffs in the games also depended on the
action of another person, the payoffs in the lotteries only
depended on the realized state of the world. The lotteries
strip the strategic component away but retain the stochastic
component that stems from the environment. We
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randomized the order of decision situations in games as well
as lotteries, and participants received no feedback about the
realized msr (or decision of the other group member) after
each decision.
Decisions from Description vs. Decision from Experience
In the description conditions, participants received
information about environmental risk as a summary
statement about probabilities and associated mrs-values
before they made their decision. In the experience
conditions, participants sampled the distribution of
mrs-values by drawing 25 cards from a deck. We used a
matched-sampling design based on Ungemach et al. (2010),
where people were forced to view a representative sample of
the underlying distributions of outcomes. Each card
contained a number corresponding to one of the two
possible msr. For example, in situation 1 the deck had 2
cards with the msr 0 and 23 cards with the msr 1.30. The
sequence of cards was randomized for each participant, yet
the two possible msr and their frequencies matched exactly
the objective probabilities given in the description
condition. Thus, sampling error could not cause any
differences observed between the two conditions.
In the experience conditions, we additionally collected
time stamps that allowed us to evaluate how long
participants viewed a certain card and whether this
influenced their decision. To check the accuracy of risk
estimates, we also asked participants after the last round
how often they saw the two sampled msr-values. In the
description conditions, participants translated the
probability statement of the last round into a frequency
statement to control whether participants accurately
understood the risk.
Further Tasks In the social dilemma conditions,
participants also faced two deterministic PGs with an msr of
1.2 and 1.4 (randomized order) after the stochastic
situations. This allowed us to investigate how cooperation
varies if the stochastic component is removed, since the
deterministic games matched the expected msr of the
stochastic PGs in situations 1, 2, and 5 (E[mrs] = 1.2) as
well as 3, 4, and 6 (E[mrs] = 1.4).
At the end of the experimental session, participants
indicated in a questionnaire which of six reasons best
explains their decision to invest/not invest into the
stochastic PGs: the probability of the mrs were (not)
sufficiently high, the values of the mrs were (not)
sufficiently high, conditional cooperation, social
uncertainty, greed/opportunism, moral values, or none of
these. A section on demographics concluded the experiment.
Participants and Procedure We randomly assigned 128
students in Jena, Germany, to one of four sessions. In the
social dilemma conditions, participants had to pass control
questions to ensure that they understood the impact of

environmental risk and of the other person’s choice on their
payoffs. All tasks were completed anonymously employing
a perfect stranger design. At the end, one decision situation
was randomly chosen to determine the payoff. Participants
earned on average 14€.

Hypotheses
Risk sensitivity in social dilemmas and lotteries Do
different levels of environmental risk affect stochastic PGs
in a similar way as they affect lotteries? To test this
presupposition, we focus on decisions from description and
employ the predictions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1992). Using a separate value and weighting
function, Prospect Theory transforms the expected outcomes
of a lottery into Prospect Theory Values (PTVs), analogous
to expected values. When comparing the PTV of a lottery’s
risky option with a sure option (always 1 in our case), the
conventional prediction is that the risky (sure) option is
picked if the PTV is larger (smaller). Investment rates into
the PG are expected to be lower than in lotteries due to a
second source of uncertainty that stems from the other
person. Thus, the PTVs based on environmental risk alone
are unlikely to be useful. However, the PTVs also produce a
ranking of the 8 decision situations in terms of proportion of
risky choices. Such a ranking can be applied to both lotteries
and stochastic PGs in the description condition. Table 1 lists
the PTVs for the eight decision situations of this experiment
based on the parameters used by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). From the PTVs, two predictions follow for PGs and
lotteries with the same expected msr:
(1a) Situations 1 and 3 (bad event occurs with 8%) will lead
to a higher number of risky choices than situations 2 and 4
(where the bad event occurs with 20%).
(1b) Situation 5 (6), where the bad event is more common,
will lead to more risky choices than situations 1 and 2 (3
and 4).
Decisions from Description and from Experience Using
lotteries, studies found that experienced small probabilities
appear to be underweighted in choices compared to
described ones (Hertwig et al., 2004). Extending this choice
pattern to social dilemmas leads to the following hypothesis
for stochastic PGs and lotteries:
(2) The risky option will be chosen more frequently in the
experience condition than in the description condition if the
bad event is less likely (situations 1 – 6 and 8), whereas this
pattern should reverse for situation 7, in which the good
event is less likely.

Results
Risk Sensitivity in Social Dilemmas and Lotteries
We would not expect risk presentation to matter unless
people are sensitive to different levels of risk in games as
they are in lotteries. For the results of hypothesis 1a and 1b,
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Table 1: Percentage of subjects investing in PGs / lotteries and differences between description and experience conditions
Stochastic PG

Decision Situations
#

Risky
Option

One rare event
1
1.30, 0.92
0, 0.08
2
1.45, 0.8
0, 0.2
3
1.55, 0.92
0, 0.08
4
1.80, 0.8
0, 0.2
Mean 1 – 4

E[msr]

Exp

Difference between
description and experience Desc Exp
conditions

Difference between
description and experience
conditions

1.2

0.93

47

44

-3 (χ²(1) = 0.06, p = 0.80)

78

81

+3 (χ²(1) = 0.10, p = 0.76)

1.2

0.84

28

28

0 (χ²(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00)

44

69

+25 (χ²(1) = 4.06, p = 0.04)

1.4

1.09

66

56

-9 (χ²(1) = 0.59, p = 0.44)

81

88

+6 (χ²(1) = 0.47, p = 0.49)

1.4

1.02

38

38

0 (χ²(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00)

63

78

+16 (χ²(1) = 1.87, p = 0.17)

45

41

-3 (χ²(1) = 0.26, p = 0.61)

66

79

+13 (χ²(1) = 5.03, p = 0.03)

0.96

25

28

3 (χ²(1) = 0.08, p = 0.77)

34

44

+9 (χ²(1) = 0.59, p = 0.44)

1.21

41

28

-13 (χ²(1) = 1.11, p = 0.29)

44

59

+16 (χ²(1) = 1.56, p = 0.21)

33

28

-5 (χ²(1) = 0.33, p = 0.57)

39

52

+13 (χ²(1) = 2.02, p = 0.16)

Two common events
5
1.80, 0.64
1.2
0.20, 0.36
6
1.95, 0.56
1.4
0.70, 0.44
Mean 5 & 6
Extreme msr
7
0.75, 0.88
3.50, 0.12
8
2.20, 0.96
0.30, 0.04

PTV Desc

Lotteries

1.1

1.23

19

16

-3 (χ²(1) = 0.11, p = 0.74)

38

16

-22 (χ²(1) = 3.92, p = 0.05)

2.1

1.70

91

88

-3 (χ²(1) = 0.16, p = 0.69)

100

97

-3 (p = 0.50, Fisher's exact
test)

we focus on data from the description conditions for
decision situations 1 to 6.
When comparing decision situations with an E[msr] = 1.2
and E[msr] = 1.4, cooperation increases with the expected
msr. The deterministic PGs yield a similar pattern: the rate
of cooperation is 53% when msr = 1.2 and, 81% when msr =
1.4 (χ2(1) = 5.74, p = 0.02). In the stochastic PGs, the
average rate of cooperation is 33% when E[msr] = 1.2 and
48% when E[msr] = 1.4 (χ2(1) = 4.23, p = 0.04). Thus,
differences in expected msr affect behavior even though the
social dilemma is maintained and the dominant strategy for
a person is not to cooperate. This replicates Guyer &
Rapoport (1972) findings and extends it to a stochastic
setting. But, besides being sensitive to different expected
outcomes, do people react to different levels of risk for
constant expected outcomes?
To address this question, we pool our data across
situations with expected msr-values of 1.2 and 1.4 to obtain
more reliable results. The mean cooperation rate is 1.7 times
higher in situations where the bad event occurs with 8%
than in situations where the bad event is common (χ2(1) =
7.12, p = 0.01). Thus, changes in the stochastic environment
have a large impact on cooperation. The difference in
cooperation between deterministic and stochastic PG with

an 8% chance of a bad event is only 10.5% and not
significant (χ2(1) = 1.62, p = 0.20).
To investigate hypotheses 1a and 1b – that situations with
8% receive more investment than situations with 20% –, one
can also rely on the pooled data across the E[msr] of 1.2 and
1.4 because the rankings of PTVs are identical for both. The
rate of investment in situations with a probability of 8%
compared to 20% sharply drops both for stochastic PGs
(from 56% to 33%, χ2(1) = 7.17, p = 0.01) and lotteries
(from 80% to 53%, χ2(1) = 10.12, p < 0.001). Paralleling
each other, stochastic PGs and lotteries thus are in line with
prediction 1a based on Prospect Theory.
For prediction 1b, the data also suggests a decline in
cooperation between situations with a probability of 20%
and those with two common events. Statistically, however,
there is no difference between these two situations, neither
for the stochastic PGs (the investment rate is constant at
33%, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00), nor for lotteries (the
investment rate declines from 53% to 39%, χ2(1) = 2.55, p =
0.11). Hypothesis 1b based on Prospect Theory – that the
rate of investment is highest with a common event – is
neither met in stochastic PGs nor in lotteries.
In summary, we find that different levels of
environmental risk both influence choice in the PGs for
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decisions from description and result in similar behavior in
stochastic PGs and lotteries. Though the data confirm the
predictions of Prospect Theory for hypothesis 1a, we did not
obtain support for hypothesis 1b for either PGs or lotteries.

Decisions from Description and from Experience
Is there a DE gap in lotteries and games? We initially
focus on pooled data from the eight decision situations to
start with more reliable results. Hypothesis 2 is directional
and states that, except for situation 7, participants should
choose the risky option more often in the experience
condition. To test this hypothesis, we subtracted the
percentage of people contributing in the experience
condition from those in the description condition, except for
situation 7 where we do the opposite. The results show a
positive gap for lotteries (χ2 (1) = 8.24, p = 0.003), with a
mean difference between experience and description of 12%
(SD = 10%).
Table 1 lists percentage of people investing in experience
and description separately for all eight decisions situations
in lotteries and stochastic PGs. For lotteries, the predicted
difference between the experience and description condition
is observed in all situations (including the reversal for
situation 7) – except for lottery 8. This lottery shows a
ceiling effect because the expected outcome is twice as high
as the sure option, so that in both conditions all participants
but one invested.
Averaging across lotteries 1-4, which contain a rare event,
shows a DE gap of 13% (Table 1). The same DE gap (13%)
occurs with lotteries containing a more common bad event
(5 and 6, Table 1). The results replicate Ludvig and Spetch
(2011), who find the DE gap also for situations with
common events. Overall, responses to decisions from
description and experience differed in lotteries as predicted
based on previous findings. Thus, the parameters we chose
for environmental risk replicate the DE gap found in the
risky choice literature.
Given that the parameters replicate the DE gap in lotteries
and the previous result that people’s decisions in games
were similarly sensitive to differences in risk as in lotteries,
we expected the risk presentation format to influence
cooperation as well. The behavior in the stochastic PGs,
however, does in this respect not match the behavior in
lotteries: the DE gap completely disappears in games (χ2(1)
= 0.38, p = 0.30). The mean difference between experience
and description in the stochastic PG is -3% (SD = 6%).
The stochastic PGs stand in stark contrast to the results in
the lotteries. In games, 6 out of 8 decision situations show
no or only minimal gaps. Experience and description
conditions do not differ for any of the decision situations. In
fact, situation 7, which is closest in spirit to the situations
used in by Hertwig et al., (2004) and Ungemach et al.,
(2009), shows a strong DE gap in lotteries, but the gap
disappears completely in the games.
Why is there a DE gap in lotteries but not in games? In
the following, we explore reasoning processes in PGs and

lotteries that provide hints to why risk presentation affects
lotteries but not stochastic PGs.
One possible explanation underlying this pattern is that
participants spend different amounts of time sampling in
lotteries and games, which may indicate different search
processes. In lotteries, participants spent more time viewing
the rare event (M = 0.91 seconds, SD = 0.99) compared to
the frequent event (M = 0.67 seconds, SD = 0.65, t(6400) =
10.01, p < 0.001). Similarly, for the games, participants
viewed the rare event (M = 0.51 seconds, SD = 0.51) longer
than the frequent event (M = 0.43 seconds, SD = 0.33,
t(6400) = 6.38, p < 0.001). In lotteries, however,
participants spent more time sampling than in games for
both rare events (t(2432) = 12.45, p < 0.001) and frequent
events (t(10368) = 24.02, p < 0.001). These differences in
sampling times thus provide evidence for potentially
different search processes in games which appear to pay less
attention to the actually observed probabilities compared to
lotteries.
To control for the accuracy of risk perception, participants
in the experience conditions stated the frequency of the two
outcomes in the last situation after they had decided. The
actual distribution of outcomes participants saw correlates
with the stated frequencies for lotteries (rS = 0.72, p <
0.001) yet to a lesser extent for stochastic PGs (rS = 0.43, p
< 0.01). In both conditions participants were calibrated to
the actual probabilities and did not underestimate but rather,
if anything, overestimated the probability of rare events.
Some researchers suggest that the larger influence of
recent events in decisions from experience may drive the
DE gap. Hertwig et al. (2004) and Rakow, Demes, &
Newell (2008) found a recency effect in decisions from
experience but Ungemach et al., (2010) and Hau, Pleskac,
Kiefer, & Hertwig (2008) did not. To test for a recency
effect, we divided the 25 samples participants draw before
each decision into two sets: from 1 to 12 (initial) and from
13 to 25 (latter). Then we computed the expected msr from
the initial samples, E[msr]1-12, and from the latter samples,
E[msr]13-25. Finally, we compare the number of risky
choices made when E[msr]13-25 > E[msr]1-12 to the number
of risky choices made when E[msr]13-25 < E[msr]1-12. When
the E[msr] of the latter, more recent sample was larger, we
find a higher number of risky choices in lotteries (χ2(1) =
3.77, p = 0.04) but not in games (χ2(1) = 0.30, p = 0.34).
This also suggests that the actual observed probabilities may
play a less important role in games than in lotteries.
Finally, for the stochastic PG in description and
experience, participants indicated their most important
reasons for cooperating as well as not cooperating. This
resulted in two statements per participants. Aggregating
across both statements, probabilities influenced cooperation
decisions in the description condition for 59% of the
participants, compared to 39% in the experience condition.
In this condition, participants rather emphasized both the
value of the msr they could obtain (20% in experience, and
3% in description) and their expectation whether the other
will (not) cooperate, i.e. conditional cooperation (20% in
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experience and 11% in description). This indicates that the
importance of the probabilities for decisions is further
reduced in the stochastic PG in experience.
In summary, participants sampled more quickly in the
stochastic PG in the experience condition than in lotteries,
as if they were paying less attention to the observed
probabilities. In line with this, subjects’ risk perception was
less accurate in games than in lotteries, and recency – a
potential cause of the DE gap – did not play a role in games,
whereas we did find a recency effect in lotteries. The
questionnaire also highlighted that probabilities were less
important in the PG in experience than the size of the values
and beliefs about others’ behavior. This provides
converging evidence that as the probabilities of the risky
option lose importance in the games, the DE gap washes
out.

General Discussion
People often cooperate in social dilemmas. We examined
how critical aspects of the stochastic environment shape
cooperation. First, different levels of environmental risk
influence cooperation. Investments in the stochastic PGs
match those observed in lotteries, with people preferring an
8% chance of a bad event to a 20% chance for constant
expected payoffs. Second, the msr-values and probabilities
chosen to implement environmental risk replicate the DE
gap within individual risky choices in lotteries. That is,
people choose the risky option more often when
experiencing the risky outcomes compared to when
receiving summary descriptions. Our key finding is that,
nevertheless, risk presentation matters in lotteries but not in
games: no DE gap existed for the social dilemmas. Process
data and subjects self-reported reasons for cooperation
suggest that the disappearance of the DE gap in games may
result from a decision process that emphasizes the size of
the outcomes and expectations about others' behavior over
outcome probabilities.
In our view, to include environmental risk and decisions
from experience into the study of cooperation invites more
realism into the laboratory. This study is only a small step to
build on insights from research on risky choice for decision
situations which combine environmental risk and social
uncertainty. In particular, models that focus more on actual
decision processes instead of choices alone may provide
promising alternative starting points to Prospect Theory,
which in our study could not account for the data in the
description condition for either lotteries or games. In
complex interactive environments, it seems rather likely that
non-compensatory decision making emerges. For instance, a
lexicographic strategy like the Priority Heuristic
(Brandstatter et al. 2006), outlines a sequential decision
process which considers outcomes in the first and
probabilities only as a second step if no decisions has been
made. In a similar fashion, other strategies that do not tradeoff reasons may be valuable to model search and decisions
processes in situations that combine environmental risk and
social uncertainty – and thus also include expectations about

others and further social reasons besides mere outcomes and
probabilities.
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